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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of the founding family’s presence on CEO turnover decisions. 
We find that family firms managed by CEOs outside the founding family (i.e., professional CEO 
family firms) have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than family firms managed by 
family members (i.e., family CEO firms) or non-family firms. These results are robust to 
alternative performance measures and CEO turnover definitions. Additional analyses indicate that 
higher family ownership leads to even higher (lower) turnover-performance sensitivity in 
professional CEO family firms (family CEO firms). These results indicate that, with regard to 
CEO turnover decisions, better monitoring of CEOs by family owners leads to the alleviation of 
agency conflicts, but the power of family CEOs leads to potential family entrenchment.   
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1. Introduction 
Family ownership and control is prevalent. For example, family firm accounts for about one third of 
S&P 500 firms and approximately one half of S&P 1,500 firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003; Chen et al. 
2008).1 The presence of the founding family significantly influences agency conflicts within a firm. On one 
hand, family ownership and control leads to better monitoring of CEOs, alleviating conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers. On the other hand, family ownership and control can lead to family 
entrenchment and conflicts of interest between family shareholders and other shareholders. Such unique 
agency conflicts in family firms likely have important implications for firm decisions. In this paper, we 
examine how family ownership and control affect CEO turnover decisions.  
We focus on CEO turnover decisions for the following reasons. CEO turnover decision is one of the 
most important corporate decisions and has significant long-term implications for a firm’s operating, 
investing, and financing activities (e.g., Huson et al. 2001). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that failing to 
replace a poorly performing CEO is probably the costliest manifestation of agency conflicts. At the same 
time, despite a long stream of research on CEO turnover, the impact of founding family ownership and 
control on CEO turnover has yet to be systematically explored.2 We fill this gap by examining how the 
unique characteristics of family shareholders affect the CEO turnover decisions. 
Prior research (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Denis et al. 1997; Huson et al. 2001) indicates that the severity 
of agency conflicts is reflected in lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. The more severe agency 
conflicts are, the more difficult it is to replace poorly performing CEOs, and the lower the CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity is. Thus, our analysis focuses on the variations in CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity. As mentioned above, family ownership and control can have two opposing effects on agency 
conflicts. On one hand, founding family members hold concentrated positions in the firm, have long 
investment horizons, and therefore care about firm value. This will lead to better monitoring of managers 
by family members and hence a higher likelihood of removing poorly performing CEOs compared to non-
                                                 
1 Following previous family firm studies (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003), we classify a firm as a family 
firm if the founders or their descendants hold the top management positions, sit on the board of directors, or 
are blockholders. For sensitivity tests, we also use alternative family firm definitions, such as further 
requiring that family ownership be higher than 5 percent. The inferences remain the same.   
2 Prior studies (e.g., Denis et al. 1997) have provided evidence that the CEO turnover probability is lower 
when founder is the CEO. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has systematically examined 
how various dimensions of family ownership and control (such as CEO identity, level of family ownership 
and control) impacts CEO turnover-performance sensitivity.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258868 
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family firms. On the other hand, the founding family wields significant influence in the firm due to its 
concentrated ownership and active involvement. This gives rise to the potential for family members to 
pursue their own interests at the expense of other shareholders. Specifically, if family members serve as 
CEOs, they enjoy the associated monetary and nonmonetary benefits and might be reluctant to leave the 
CEO position even when the firm has performed poorly.  
Consequently, the two effects that originate from family ownership and control, better monitoring of 
CEOs and potential rent extraction by family owners, have opposite implications for CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity depending on who serves as CEO in family firms. To test these implications, we 
separate family firms that are run by a member of the founding family, that is, family CEO firms, from 
those run by a hired professional CEO, that is, professional CEO family firms. In a family CEO firm, the 
founding family enjoys certain private benefits when a family member serves as the CEO.3 Consequently, 
the founding family may choose to sacrifice firm value in order to keep these private benefits, leading to 
low CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. In a non-family firm, due to the separation of ownership and 
management, the incumbent CEO may resist being replaced after poor performance, also leading to low 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. In contrast, in a professional CEO family firm, the effective 
monitoring by the founding family leads to prompt replacement of poorly performing CEOs and hence high 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Thus, we predict that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is 
lower for both family CEO firms and non-family firms than for professional CEO family firms. 
Using data from 1,865 firms in the S&P 1500 Index over the period 1996–2005, we find that as 
predicted, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for both family CEO firms and non-family firms 
than for professional CEO family firms. When annual stock returns decrease from the top 25th percentile to 
the bottom 25th percentile, the increase in the predicted CEO turnover probability is about zero for family 
CEO firms and 2.7 percentage points for non-family firms, but 6.7 percentage points for professional CEO 
family firms. A battery of sensitivity tests (such as the use of alternative performance measures, using 
forced turnovers, or excluding CEO turnovers where the departing CEO serves as the chairman of the 
board) leads to the same inferences. 
We then explore cross-sectional variation within family firms to reinforce our inferences and to 
                                                 
3 Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) discuss various types of private benefits of keeping family 
management. We elaborate on these in Section 2.  
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provide additional insights. We find that while higher family ownership leads to even higher turnover-
performance sensitivity in professional CEO family firms, it leads to even lower turnover-performance 
sensitivity in family CEO firms, consistent with the impact of family presence increasing with family 
ownership. We also find that both founder CEO and descendant CEO firms have lower turnover-
performance sensitivity than professional CEO family firms, indicating that both types of firms are subject 
to potential entrenchment problems over CEO turnover decisions.  
We further examine the announcement return in response to CEO turnovers to corroborate the 
inferences from the turnover-performance sensitivity analyses. If investors expect that it is difficult for 
certain firms to replace poorly performing CEOs and the poor performance could persist, investors would 
bid down the stock price.  Thus, when poorly performing CEOs are indeed replaced in such firms, investors 
will react more positively. Since the turnover-performance sensitivity analysis indicates that family CEO 
firms and non-family firms are less likely to replace poorly performing CEOs than professional CEO 
family firms, we expect the market to react more positively to CEO turnover announcements in the first 
two types of firms. Consistent with this prediction, we find that the 3-day window return around CEO 
turnover announcements is higher for family CEO firms and non-family firms than for professional CEO 
family firms.4  
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we contribute to the CEO 
turnover literature by systematically examining the impact of family ownership and control on CEO 
turnover decisions. Our findings highlight that the two distinct features in family firms, namely better 
monitoring of CEOs and potential family entrenchment, significantly affect the effectiveness of replacing 
poorly performing CEOs, but in different directions depending on who runs the firm. Our evidence 
indicates that better monitoring and disciplining of professional CEOs by family owners lead to the 
alleviation of agency conflicts, but the power of family CEOs leads to potential family entrenchment. 
Our finding of significant variation of CEO turnover-performance sensitivity across the three types 
of firms emphasizes the importance of controlling for firm type in future turnover research. For example, 
Brickley (2003) observes that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity documented in prior research is too 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, we also find that the average market reaction to CEO turnover announcements in 
professional CEO family firms is significantly negative, consistent with such announcements conveying 
adverse information about firm performance or excessive firing of CEOs in professional CEO family firms.  
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low. We find that this is at least partially due to the pooling of different types of firms together. The 
marginal effect of performance in professional CEO family firms is as high as that of CEO age, the most 
important determinant of CEO turnover documented in prior research. 
Our evidence of higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in professional CEO family firms also 
adds to the evidence of the monitoring role of influential shareholders, family owners here, in the CEO 
turnover setting. This is in contrast to Parrino et al. (2003), who find that institutional investors “vote with 
their feet.” Unlike institutional investors, family owners are under-diversified, have long investment 
horizon, and usually sit on the board (in our sample, they hold 18 percent of the board seats). These unique 
features of family owners likely contribute to their active monitoring role in CEO turnover decisions.   
Second, our paper contributes to the family firm literature by enhancing our understanding of unique 
agency conflicts in family firms. We provides direct evidence that while the founding family’s presence 
leads to effective monitoring of CEOs in professional CEO family firms, it strengthens CEO power and 
control in family CEO firms.  Thus, our study complements the emerging literature that examines the 
impact of family ownership and control on firm performance and valuation (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003; 
Chrisman et al. 2004; Villalonga and Amit 2006). While firm performance and valuation captures agency 
conflicts, they can also be confounded by other factors. Since CEO turnover decision is directly reflective 
of CEO monitoring and CEO power, it offers us a cleaner setting to examine the influence of family 
ownership and control on agency conflicts. For example, we find that both founder CEOs and descendant 
CEOs are subject to potential entrenchment problems over CEO turnover decisions. This result contrasts 
with prior research on family firm valuation (e.g., Villalonga and Amit 2006), which generally finds that 
founder CEO firms outperform but descendant CEO firms underperform non-family firms. This contrast 
highlights the importance of studying individual corporate decisions such as CEO turnovers; the results 
from firm valuation analyses might not generalize to individual corporate decisions.  
Lastly, our findings suggest that it is important to separate family CEO firms from professional CEO 
family firms in family firm studies. For example, Chen et al. (2008) and Ali et al. (2007) find that family 
firms are less likely to provide managerial forecasts, indicating that family firms are less transparent. Our 
results suggest that while it is possible that voluntary disclosure is lower in professional CEO family firms 
because of better monitoring of the CEO by founding families, lower voluntary disclosure in family CEO 
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firms can be due to founding families’ reluctance to disclose information in order to avoid scrutiny by other 
investors. Therefore, future research can focus on family CEO firms and examine the association between 
their voluntary disclosure behavior and potential rent seeking activities.  
Our paper is related to but distinct from Hillier and McColgan (2009, hereafter HM) in several 
important ways. HM examines the impact of family control on CEO turnovers using a sample of 683 UK 
firms over the period 1992−1998. First, HM do not separate professional CEO family firms and non-family 
firms. As a result, they are unable to examine the incentive alignment effect of family ownership and 
control, and their test of family entrenchment actually captures the net effect of two opposite forces –family 
monitoring and family entrenchment. In contrast, we investigate a more complete research question and our 
message of the impact of family ownership and control on agency conflicts is more balanced. Second, 
although HM find that family CEO firms have lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than other 
firms, they find that the two subsets of family CEO firms, founder CEO and descendant CEO firms, have 
similar turnover-performance sensitivity as other firms. One potential explanation for this puzzling result is 
the noise introduced by lumping professional CEO family firms and non-family firms together as the 
comparison group. In contrast, we provide strong and consistent evidence for both types of family CEO 
firms. Lastly, we also examine the impact of family control on agency conflicts in the merger and 
acquisition setting.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides literature review and hypothesis 
development; Section 3 discusses data; Section 4 reports main empirical results; Section 5 reports 
additional and sensitivity tests; and Section 6 concludes.    
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
Extant literature on family firms  
Family firms are a prevalent organization form in the U.S. (e.g., Anderson and Reeb 2003; Chen et 
al. 2008). In our sample of the S&P 1500 firms, family firms account for approximately 44 percent. On 
average, founding families hold 16 percent of the equity, 18 percent of the directorships, and 60 percent of 
the CEO positions in family firms. These distinct features lead to unique conflicts of interest in family 
firms and thus have important implications for family firms’ operations and performance. 
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An emerging literature on U.S. family firms examines the impact of family ownership and control on 
firm valuation and performance.5 For instance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that among S&P 500 firms, 
family firms exhibit significantly better accounting performance and have significantly higher Tobin’s Q 
than non-family firms. This suggests that for firm valuation, the positive impact of better alignment of 
interest between managers and shareholders in family firms outweighs the negative impact of potential 
family entrenchment. Villalonga and Amit (2006) further find that while founder CEO firms outperform 
non-family firms, descendant CEO firms underperform non-family firms. On the other hand, Chrisman, 
Chua and Litz (2004) show that there is no difference between family firms and non-family firms in terms 
of sales growth. A recent study, Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009), further find that more opaque family 
firms are associated with lower firm value than non-family firms, providing support for family 
entrenchment when there is less transparency.  
Recent studies also investigate how family ownership and control affect various corporate decisions. 
Wang (2006) and Ali et al. (2007) find that family firms on average have better earnings quality compared 
with non-family firms. Chen et al. (2008) find that family firms are less likely to provide voluntary 
disclosure. Chen et al. (2010) show that family firms are less tax aggressive than non-family firms. 
Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2008) document that family firms spend less on R&D investment than non-
family firms. Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012) find that family firms’ short-selling is more informative 
than non-family firms’, consistent with family owners taking advantage of their private information. While 
some of these studies suggest that family firms are subject to fewer agency problems (e.g., Wang 2006; Ali 
et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2010), others suggest the opposite (e.g., Anderson et al. 2008; Anderson et al. 
2012). Collectively these studies indicate that the impact of family ownership and control on agency 
problems is likely context specific. 
We continue this line of research by examining the impact of family ownership and control on CEO 
turnover decisions. CEO turnover decision is likely one of the most important corporate decisions given the 
significant impact it has on all aspects of a firm’s operations. Both Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson, 
Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) show that replacing a poorly performing CEO can improve firm performance 
                                                 
5 We focus our discussion on studies of family firms in the U.S. to save space. Studies of family firms in 
other countries generally yield similar inferences (for examples, see Claessens et al. 2002; Faccio et al. 
2001; Cheung et al. 2006).  
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and subsequently firm value. Conversely, Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) document that delayed CEO 
dismissal leads to a higher incidence of bankruptcy and delisting. Further, as pointed out by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), poorly performing managers who resist being replaced might be the costliest manifestation 
of agency conflicts. Since, as discussed earlier, family ownership and control can fundamentally change 
agency conflicts, we expect family control to have significant influence over CEO turnover decisions.  
In addition, compared to prior family firm valuation studies that assess the net effect of agency 
conflicts in family firms, CEO turnover decision offers us a unique setting where we can separately 
demonstrate the influence of  better monitoring of CEOs and family entrenchment by splitting family firms 
based on the identity of CEO: family CEO or hired CEO. Thus our paper complements the family firm 
valuation studies.  
 
Extant literature on CEO turnover 
The early literature on CEO turnover mainly focuses on the key determinant of turnover: firm 
performance (accounting performance and/or stock performance). These include Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Barro and Barro (1990), and Kaplan (1994a, b). These studies 
demonstrate that poor performance leads to a higher likelihood of CEO turnover.  Subsequent CEO 
turnover studies examine other determinants of CEO turnover, including board structure (Weisbach 1988), 
industry homogeneity (Parrino 1997), product market competition (DeFond and Park 1999), CEO 
ownership (Denis et al. 1997), accounting information properties (Engel, Hayes, and Wang 2003), business 
cycle (Eisfeldt and Rampini 2008), firm performance expectation (Farrell and Whidbee 2003), and firm 
risk characteristics (Bushman et al. 2010). These studies find that such firm characteristics affect CEO 
turnover probability and/or turnover-performance sensitivity. 
Our study is most closely related to studies that examine how the variation in agency conflicts 
impacts CEO turnover decisions. Weisbach (1988) finds that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is 
higher for firms where board monitoring is more effective. Denis et al. (1997) finds that CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity is lower in firms with high CEO ownership, consistent with high CEO ownership 
leading to more CEO power and entrenchment. They also find some evidence that having a blockholder 
increases CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Parrino et al. (2003) find that the number of institutional 
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investors and the percentage of institutional ownership decrease in the year prior to forced CEO turnovers. 
They conclude that institutional investors “vote with their feet” when they are not satisfied with CEO’s 
performance. Since family ownership and control fundamentally affect agency conflicts in family firms, we 
examine how this unique group of shareholders affects CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Below we 
discuss the unique features of family ownership and how these unique features enable family owners to 
exert important influence on CEO turnover decisions beyond institutional investors and outside 
blockholders.   
 
Hypothesis development 
Following previous family firm studies, we classify a firm as a family firm if the founders or their 
descendants hold the top management positions, sit on the board of directors, or are blockholders. We 
further separate family firms into those run by family members (founders or descendants) and those run by 
hired professional CEOs. Thus, we explore the differences in CEO turnover-performance sensitivity across 
the following three types of U.S. public firms:  
- family CEO firms: family firms with a family member (founder or descendant) as CEO; 
- professional CEO family firms: family firms with a hired professional CEO; and  
- non-family firms: all other public firms.   
 
Below we discuss agency conflicts related to CEO turnover decisions for each of the three types of firms 
and the implications for CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. 
In a family CEO firm, since a member of the founding family holds the CEO position, the interests 
of managers and shareholders are aligned. However, with considerable influence from the founding family 
over corporate decisions, family members may extract private benefits of control through the CEO position. 
Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) identify three types of private benefits associated with maintaining 
family management. First, holding the CEO position generates both monetary (e.g., compensation and 
perks) and non-monetary (e.g., social status) benefits for the family member who runs the firm. Second, a 
family CEO running the firm enhances the reputation of the family. Third, it would be easier for the family 
to expropriate other shareholders if a family member runs the firm. On the other hand, retaining a poorly 
performing CEO is costly to the family, as potential poor performance reduces the value of the family’s 
ownership in the firm. Ultimately the founding family compares the private benefits with the potential costs 
 9
and may favor retaining a poorly performing family CEO if the private benefits outweigh the costs, 
although doing so may hurt the firm value and is sub-optimal for minority shareholders.6 
In contrast, in a professional CEO family firm or a non-family firm, ownership is separated from 
management, leading to agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. However, what distinguishes 
a professional CEO family firm from a non-family firm is the direct monitoring of the CEO by the 
founding family in the former. Such monitoring is effective because the founding family has the expertise, 
the incentive, and the means to do so. First, since the founding family started the business, the family 
members know the business well so that it is easier for them than for other shareholders (including other 
large shareholders) to judge whether the incumbent CEO is competent. Second, given its less diversified 
asset holding, family name concern, and long investment horizon, the founding family has stronger 
incentives than other shareholders to monitor the CEO (e.g., Anderson et al. 2003). Lastly, with large 
ownership and representatives sitting on the board, the founding family is influential over key corporate 
decisions, including the CEO turnover decision. Consequently, CEOs in professional CEO family firms can 
be effectively monitored and promptly removed after poor performance. 
Are CEOs in these two types of firms subject to entrenchment regarding CEO turnover decisions? If 
the CEOs in these firms hold a large percentage of shares, they are susceptible. However, such cases are 
rare. In our sample, only 0.95 percent of hired CEOs (in both professional CEO family firms and non-
family firms) hold 5 percent or more of the firm’s stocks (i.e., are blockholders). In contrast, 47 percent of 
family CEOs are blockholders. In addition, in a professional CEO family firm, since the CEO is not part of 
the founding family, the family is unlikely to protect him/her from being fired after poor performance.7 
Consequently, CEO entrenchment arising from CEO’s large stock ownership should not be a concern in 
non-family firms or professional CEO family firms. Nevertheless, we control for CEO ownership in the 
empirical analysis.  
Note that the effect of family ownership and control on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is 
different from that of CEO ownership. First, regarding CEO turnover decisions, CEO power increases with 
                                                 
6 Business Week (August 21-28, 2006) commented that “[given his poor performance,] CEO Bill Ford 
would have been fired by now by most boards if his name were Smith.” Bill Ford eventually left the CEO 
post in September 2006 but kept the chairman position. By that time, he had been CEO for 5 years.  
7 Similarly, outside blockholders, if present, do not have the incentive to side with a poorly performing 
CEO in either professional CEO family firms or non-family firms. Outside blockholders in these two types 
of firms may enhance monitoring. We control for outside blockholding in our tests.  
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CEO ownership so that the incumbent CEO can resist being removed, leading to lower CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity (Denis et al. 1997). In contrast, depending on whether the incumbent CEO is from 
the founding family, family ownership and control can exacerbate agency conflicts in certain cases (in 
family CEO firms), the same as CEO ownership does, but can enhance monitoring and mitigate agency 
conflicts in other cases (in professional CEO family firms), as discussed above. Second, even in cases when 
the CEO is a family member, the impact of family ownership and control arises not only from the family 
CEO’s ownership, but also from the ownership and control of other family members.  
In summary, regarding CEO turnover decisions, CEOs in professional CEO family firms are 
effectively monitored and are not protected by the founding family. In contrast, CEOs in non-family firms 
are monitored less effectively, and CEOs in family CEO firms are protected from removal after poor 
performance due to founding families’ potential incentives to extract private benefits of control.  Since the 
difficulty in replacing poorly performing CEOs leads to lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, we 
predict that CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for family CEO firms and non-family firms 
than for professional CEO family firms.8 Stated formally, our two hypotheses are (in alternative forms):  
HYPOTHESIS 1. Ceteris Paribus, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for family CEO 
firms than for professional CEO family firms.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. Ceteris Paribus, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for non-family 
firms than for professional CEO family firms.  
 
Between family CEO firms and non-family firms, it is unclear which type of firm is subject to greater 
agency conflicts in the CEO turnover context. Accordingly, we do not have a formal prediction on the 
difference in CEO turnover-performance sensitivity between these two types of firms. 
  
3. Sample and data 
Our sample consists of 10,928 firm-years from 1,865 firms in the S&P 1500 Index covering the 
period from 1996–2005. These are the firms for which required data is available from Compustat (for 
financial accounting information), CRSP (for stock return information), ExecuComp (for CEO turnover 
and ownership information), and Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) (for corporate 
                                                 
8 Note that we are not arguing that a professional CEO family firm is the best organization form of the 
three. The foregoing discussion of agency conflicts across the three types of firm is restricted to the CEO 
turnover decision. The extent of the agency conflicts might be different regarding other corporate decisions. 
 11
governance information).  
Our collection of ownership and founding-family-related information follows Villalonga and Amit 
(2006). First, we start with ExecuComp and IRRC databases to identify key insiders for each firm and to 
compile ownership for each insider (top executives and directors).9 Second, for each firm-year we collect 
information about the founding family: the identity of founders, whether founders or their family members 
are actively involved in the firm (e.g., holding key executive positions, being directors or blockholders), 
and if they are actively involved, the ownership of the founding family. This step is completed through 
reading of Hoover’s Company Records, company proxy statements and websites. Third, from proxy 
statements we collect the identities and ownership of blockholders who are not insiders or founding family 
members. Additional information about corporate governance is obtained from IRRC.  
We use CEO information in ExecuComp to identify CEO turnovers. A potential CEO turnover is 
identified when the CEO name at the end of year t is different from that at the end of year t-1. We then use 
the CEO name and the turnover year to search Factiva for the turnover news announcement to understand 
the reasons behind the turnover. We exclude cases that involve mergers, spinoffs, CEO death, or interim 
CEOs, since in such cases the CEO turnover is unlikely to be related to firm performance.10 This step leads 
to our sample of all CEO turnovers.  
Among the sample of all CEO turnovers, we follow the approach used in Parrino (1997) to identify 
forced turnovers. If the announcement contains one of the following words: “fired,” “resigned,” or 
“demoted,” we classify the turnover as forced. We further check the reason for the CEO’s resignation. The 
turnover stays as forced if the reason is one of the following: legal problem, earnings management, and 
disagreement with the board; otherwise, it is reclassified as a voluntary turnover. In addition, we classify 
                                                 
9 During the data collection, we noticed two issues with the ownership data reported in ExecuComp and 
IRRC databases: (1) The databases often report the total family ownership under each individual family 
member; (2) For companies with more than one class of voting shares (dual-class firms), the databases 
usually only report ownership in one class of shares (the choice of class seems arbitrary) and occasionally 
report the combined voting power. When these issues arise, we rely on proxy statements to make 
corrections. Because we want to capture the family’s influence over key corporate decisions, we measure 
family ownership in terms of voting power, that is, the proportion of the voting power controlled by the 
family. Consequently, family ownership based on voting power is the same as family ownership based on 
cash flow rights for single-class firms, but it is typically higher than family ownership based on cash flow 
rights for dual-class firms. Our inferences remain the same if we exclude dual-class firms.  
10 Specifically, if in year t the firm experiences mergers, spinoffs, or CEO death, the CEO turnover is 
excluded. With respect to interim CEOs, we keep the cases where a CEO is replaced by an interim CEO but 
exclude the cases where an interim CEO is replaced by a new CEO.  
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“retirement” as a forced turnover if the CEO retired at an age of 60 years old or younger. All the other 
turnovers are classified as voluntary.  
There is a tradeoff between using all CEO turnovers versus only using forced CEO turnovers. The 
advantage of examining forced turnovers is that forced turnovers better capture CEO dismissals due to poor 
performance. The drawback, however, is the subjectivity used in identifying them due to the bias embedded 
in CEO turnover announcements. To save face for both the board and the CEO, a firm typically does not 
announce the firing of a CEO; instead, the firm will disguise it as a retirement or a resignation for personal 
reasons.11 This introduces noises into the classification between forced and voluntary turnovers. The 
number of classified forced turnover is also quite small. Both factors potentially reduce the power of tests. 
Given these considerations, we use all CEO turnovers in the main analyses and examine forced CEO 
turnovers in a sensitivity test, as done in most prior CEO turnover studies.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Panels A and B in Table 1 report the composition of our sample. In contrast to prior family firm 
studies that focus on S&P 500 or Fortune 500 firms, our sample includes firm-years from S&P 500, S&P 
MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600.12 Because family firms are on average smaller, including S&P 400 
and S&P 600 results in a higher percentage of family firm-years (44 percent) relative to prior studies (e.g., 
Ali et al. 2007).  Panel B confirms that the percentage of family firms is higher for S&P 400 and S&P 600 
than for S&P 500. Among family firms, 60 percent are family CEO firms (2,879 firm-years) and 40 percent 
are professional CEO family firms (1,925 firm-years). Among the 2,879 family CEO firm-years, 2,022 
have founder CEOs and 857 have descendent CEOs (untabulated). The distribution based on the number of 
unique firms is similar.   
Panel C in Table 1 reports the summary statistics on CEO and firm characteristics for the full sample 
and for each type of firms. Family ownership is higher in family CEO firms than in professional CEO 
family firms (18.1 vs. 12.3 percent). Overall, 11.0 percent of the sample experiences CEO turnover. The 
                                                 
11 The retirement announcement made by the 62-year-old CEO of Bank of America, Ken Lewis, on 
September 30, 2009 is an example of this. The series of events preceding the announcement suggests that 
he was probably forced out. However, it was announced as a retirement and the classification scheme used 
in this paper or in Parrino (1997) will code it as a voluntary rather than a forced turnover.  
12 In an untabulated sensitivity test, we conduct the analyses separately for S&P 500, S&P 400 and S&P 
600 firms, in order to ensure that our results are not driven by smaller firms in our sample as prior research 
of family firms generally focus on S&P 500 or Fortune 500 firms. We find that the results hold for all the 
three groups. 
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proportion of firms experiencing CEO turnover is lower in family CEO firms (9.0 percent) and non-family 
firms (11.7 percent) than in professional CEO family firms (12.1 percent) (only the difference between 
family CEO firms and professional CEO family firms is statistically significant, though). The same applies 
to forced turnovers. Untabulated analysis indicates that in the sample, 74 percent of the incoming CEOs for 
family CEO firms that experience CEO turnovers are from outside the founding family, while 26 percent of 
family CEOs pass the baton on to their family members.  
For the full sample, CEO ownership is on average 2.31 percent; it is higher in family CEO firms 
(7.36 percent) than in professional CEO family firms and non-family firms (about 0.50 percent). This is due 
to the fact that the family CEO accumulates his or her ownership mainly through original ownership 
(founders) or inheritance (descendants), rather than through incentive compensation, as is usually the case 
for professional CEOs. The mean (median) CEO age is 55.1 (55) and the mean (median) CEO tenure is 8.0 
(6) years. The average CEO tenure is much shorter for professional CEO family firms and non-family firms 
(4.6 and 6 years, respectively) than for family CEO firms (14.5 years).  
Stock performance, measured as annual market-adjusted stock returns, is higher for family CEO 
firms than for the other two types of firms. The industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) is similar across 
the three groups of firms. Non-family firms are on average larger than professional CEO family firms, 
which are larger than family CEO firms. Also, family firms are less likely to use leverage than non-family 
firms. The three types of firms are not statistically different from each other with respect to other firm 
characteristics including industry competition, growth, and return volatility. Non-family firms are more 
likely to have outside blockholders than family firms. Compared to other firms, family CEO firms have 
lower entrenchment index (E-index) and professional CEO family firms are less likely to have the same 
person as both the CEO and chairman of the board.  
 
4. Main analyses  
 
Primary analyses 
Following prior CEO turnover studies (e.g., Parrino 1997), we use the following LOGIT regression 
to test whether CEO turnover-performance sensitivity varies across firm types as predicted in Hypothesis 1 
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where: 
CEO_turnover = 1 for firm-years with CEO turnover in the next year, and 0 otherwise; 
Performance = annual market-adjusted stock returns or industry-adjusted ROA; 
D_FamilyCEO = 1 for family CEO firms, and 0 otherwise; 
D_NonFamily = 1 for non-family firms, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Firm and year subscripts are omitted for brevity. Note that all independent variables are measured in the 
year before CEO turnover. To reduce the impact of extreme values, we winsorize all independent variables 
at the 1st and 99th percentile (except for dummy variables). The standard errors are adjusted for firm and 
year clustering. 
Under this specification, the coefficient on the performance measure, D1, captures the CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity for professional CEO family firms; the coefficient on the interaction between the 
performance measure and D_FamilyCEO, D1a, captures the incremental sensitivity for family CEO firms; 
and the coefficient on the interaction between the performance measure and D_NonFamily, D1b, captures 
the incremental sensitivity for non-family firms. Since CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is negative, 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 imply that D1a and D1b are positive. The net turnover-performance sensitivity for family 
CEO firms (non-family firms) is D1 + D1a (D1 + D1b) and the difference between family CEO firms and non-
family firms is D1a - D1b. We also include the two firm-type dummy variables in the model to capture the 
difference in the CEO turnover probability across firm types independent of firm performance. 
Following Parrino (1997) and other CEO turnover studies, we consider both stock performance and 
accounting performance in the analyses. We also follow these studies when selecting control variables. 
Specifically, we control for CEO personal characteristics (CEO age, CEO tenure, and CEO ownership), 
firm characteristics (firm size and Herfindahl index), and corporate governance (including an indicator for 
high outside blockholder ownership, CEO-chairman duality, and the E-index). Older CEOs are more likely 
                                                 
13 Our model specification follows Parrino (1997), except that we include more control variables in order to 
be comprehensive. Parrino (1997) controls for CEO age, a dummy variable for family CEO firms, and firm 
size (Parrino finds a negative association between CEO turnover probability and the family CEO dummy.) 
Besides these variables, we also control for a dummy variable for non-family firms, CEO ownership, CEO 
tenure, the Herfindahl index, and several corporate governance variables.  
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to leave the position due to health, retirement, or other reasons (Parrino 1997). Prior research finds that 
after controlling for CEO age, CEO turnover probability decreases with CEO tenure, which likely reflects a 
CEO’s power accumulated over time at the CEO position. Denis et al. (1997) find that CEO turnover 
probability is lower in firms with higher CEO ownership. However, including CEO ownership may bias 
against finding results for family CEO firms in our context as CEO ownership includes the ownership of 
family CEOs. Nevertheless, we include CEO ownership variable in the analysis to ensure the robustness of 
our results. Prior research also finds that CEO turnover probability is lower for large firms than for small 
firms (e.g., Denis et al. 1997; Parrino 1997). Another important determinant of CEO turnover is industry 
competition (DeFond and Park 1999; Parrino 1997). We use Herfindahl index to proxy for the 
competitiveness of the firm’s industry. Since CEO turnover is an important corporate decision, the 
effectiveness of corporate governance and the CEO’s power can have significant impact on the turnover 
decision (e.g., Weisbach 1988). Therefore, we include an indicator for high outside blockholder ownership, 
an indicator for CEO-chairman duality, and the anti-takeover measure E-index (e.g., Gompers et al. 2003; 
Bebchuk et al. 2009).14 While high outside blockholder ownership may strengthen corporate governance 
and weaken the CEO’s power due to better monitoring, increasing CEO turnover probability, CEO-
chairman duality and high E-index may strengthen the CEO’s power, reducing CEO turnover probability.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Table 2 reports our main results, with firm performance measured as market-adjusted stock returns 
in the left column and industry-adjusted ROA in the right column.  In the table, we also report the marginal 
effect for each variable in order to assess the economic significance of the coefficient estimates. As in prior 
research (e.g., Denis et al. 1997), we calculate the marginal effect as the change in the implied CEO 
turnover probability when the variable of interest changes from its 25th to 75th percentile value, or from 0 to 
1 if the variable is a dummy variable, with all other explanatory variables held constant at their respective 
means. The marginal effect of the interaction terms between firm type and performance is calculated as the 
difference in the marginal effect of performance for this type of firm and professional CEO family firms.  
As reported in the table, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is significantly negative for 
                                                 
14 E-index (i.e., the entrenchment index) is developed in Bebchuk et al. (2009) and is based on a subset of 
governance provisions upon which G-index is based (Gompers et al. 2003). We use the E-index instead of 
G-index because Bebchuk et al. (2009) find that the provisions in the E-index fully drive the correlation 
between G-index and firm value documented in earlier studies.   
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professional CEO family firms. More importantly, consistent with our predictions in Hypothesis 1 and 2, 
both incremental sensitivities are positive and significant. That is, CEO turnover is less sensitive to 
performance for family CEO firms and non-family firms than for professional CEO family firms. The 
increase in CEO turnover probability, when stock return decreases from its 75th to 25th percentile value, is 
6.72 percentage points for professional CEO family firms, but it is 6.60 percentage points lower for family 
CEO firms and 3.98 percentage points lower for non-family firms. These differences in turnover-
performance sensitivity are economically significant given that the sample CEO turnover proportion is 
about 11 percent. Note that the marginal effect of performance for professional CEO family firms is larger 
than what is reported in prior studies for average firms. This is due to our partitioning of the sample based 
on firm type. Without the partition, the marginal effect of performance is 2.26 percent, comparable to prior 
studies. This again indicates the significant impact firm type has on CEO turnover decisions and the 
importance of partitioning firms into three types as we have done here.  
We would also like to highlight that CEO turnover probability is significantly lower in family CEO 
firms and non-family firms than in professional CEO family firms, after controlling for performance and 
other factors. This result suggests that it is more difficult to replace CEOs in family CEO firms and non-
family firms than in professional CEO family firms. The results for control variables are broadly consistent 
with prior literature. CEO ownership has a significantly negative impact, indicating that CEOs with higher 
ownership are less likely to be replaced;15 CEO age has a significantly positive impact on CEO turnover; 
firm size is negatively correlated with turnover probability; and the turnover probability increases with 
blockholder ownership. CEO tenure, Herfindahl index, E-index, and CEO-chairman duality are not 
significant in explaining CEO turnover probability.  
Another commonly used performance measure in the CEO turnover literature is accounting 
performance. Prior studies demonstrate that accounting performance can explain CEO turnover, although it 
is not as powerful as stock returns, because stock returns contain more information than historically-based 
accounting performance (e.g., DeFond and Park 1999; Engel et al. 2003). To investigate whether our 
results hold when accounting performance is used, we re-estimate the regression using industry-adjusted 
                                                 
15 Untabulated analysis indicates that CEO ownership has an insignificant impact on CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity when firm type dummies and their interaction with performance are included in the 
regressions.  
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return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. The results are reported in the right side of Table 2. The 
inferences are the same: professional CEO family firms have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity 
than both family CEO firms and non-family firms. We find that consistent with prior studies, the 
explanatory power of ROA, measured as the marginal effect of performance, is lower than stock returns. 
Accordingly, in the following analyses we use stock returns to measure performance and the inferences 
remain similar if we use ROA as the performance measure instead. 
The bottom of Table 2 reports the net CEO turnover-performance sensitivity for family CEO firms 
and non-family firms and the difference between the two. When stock return is used as the performance 
measure, while the marginal effect of performance is 6.72 percent for professional CEO family firms, it is 
only 2.74 percent (statistically significant) for non-family firms and is indistinguishable from zero for 
family CEO firms. The difference between family CEO firms and non-family firms is significantly 
different from zero. This suggests that regarding CEO turnover decisions, the adverse impact of family 
power and entrenchment in family CEO firms seems to be greater than that of poor monitoring of CEOs in 
non-family firms.  
 
Cross-sectional variation within family firms 
The above analyses indicate that the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is systematically 
different across family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms and non-family firms. In this section, in 
order to strengthen our main inference, we explore cross-sectional variations within family firms along two 
important dimensions: founder versus descendant CEOs in family CEO firms and the level of family 
ownership in family firms. 
The motivation for separating founder CEOs from descendant CEOs is two-fold. First, prior research 
finds that founder status reduces CEO turnover probability (e.g., Brickley 2003), although the impact of 
founder CEO on the turnover-performance sensitivity has yet to be explored. Second, prior research (e.g., 
Villalonga and Amit 2006) finds that compared to non-family firms, founder CEO firms are associated with 
a valuation premium, but descendant CEO firms are associated with a valuation discount. If one uses the 
valuation result to infer the extent of agency conflicts and generalize the inference to individual corporate 
decisions such as the CEO turnover decision, one would predict that while descendant CEO firms are 
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subject to more agency conflicts and have lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, founder CEO firms 
are not. To shed light on these issues, we separately examine the effect of founder CEOs and descendent 
CEOs on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity.  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Panel A in Table 3 reports the results. As in prior studies, the main effect of the founder CEO 
dummy is significantly negative. More importantly, we find that both founder CEO and descendent CEO 
firms are associated with lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than professional CEO family firms. 
This analysis indicates that (i) our results on the impact of firm type on CEO turnover-performance 
sensitivity hold after controlling for founder status and (ii) both founder and descendent CEOs are reluctant 
to give up their CEO posts even after they perform poorly. Further, the evidence that it is more difficult to 
replace both poor-performing founder CEOs and descendant CEOs than professional CEOs suggests that 
one cannot generalize the inferences from firm valuation to individual corporate decisions, at least not in 
the case of CEO turnover decisions.  
Given that the effective monitoring of CEOs in professional CEO family firms and the potential of 
family entrenchment in family CEO firms stem mainly from the founding family’s ownership and control, 
we expect that the effect of the family presence is stronger when the level of family ownership is higher. To 
test this prediction, we use 25 percent ownership as the cutoff to further separate out professional CEO 
family firms with high family ownership and family CEO firms with high family ownership. We construct 
two indicator variables for these two groups of firms: D_ProfessionalCEO_High and D_FamilyCEO_High. 
We then add these two indicator variables and their interactions with the performance measure to 
regression (1). Under this specification, the coefficient on Performance × D_ProfessionalCEO_High 
(Performance × D_FamilyCEO_High) captures the difference in CEO turnover-performance sensitivity 
between professional CEO family firms (family CEO firms) with high versus low family ownership.  
The regression results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. As expected, professional CEO family 
firms with high family ownership have higher turnover-performance sensitivity than those with low family 
ownership (p=0.001), consistent with even better monitoring of hired CEOs by founding families with 
higher ownership. Also as expected, CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is lower for family CEO firms 
with high family ownership than for those with low family ownership (p=0.014), consistent with even 
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greater potential of family entrenchment in family CEO firms with high family ownership. These results 
reinforce the inferences from our primary analyses: family ownership leads to effective monitoring of 
professional CEOs in family firms, but the power of family CEOs leads to extraction of private benefits of 
control. 
 
5. Sensitivity tests and additional analyses 
In this section, we first conduct a series of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our results. We 
then provide some additional analyses to further corroborate evidence from the main analyses.   
 
Alternative definitions of CEO turnover 
One of the challenges facing CEO turnover researchers is what type of CEO turnovers to use in the 
analysis. CEO turnover occurs for various reasons and unfortunately companies and departing CEOs are 
usually not forthcoming with the underlying reasons behind the turnover, as discussed earlier. In the 
analyses reported above, we follow prior research (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Denis et al. 1997) and include all 
CEO turnovers. In this subsection, we explore alternative definitions of CEO turnovers to investigate 
whether our main results are robust.  
First, we use forced CEO turnover to replicate the main analysis. In our sample, 639 firm-years (5.85 
percent of the sample) experienced forced CEO turnovers and CEO_turnover is set as one for these firm-
years. CEO_turnover is set as zero for firm-years with voluntary CEO turnovers in this test; the results are 
similar if we delete voluntary CEO turnover firm-years. Consistent with the results based on all CEO 
turnovers, the forced turnover results indicate that professional CEO family firms have the highest CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity, followed by non-family firms and family CEO firms. Also, as in the main 
analyses, both the family CEO firm dummy and the non-family firm dummy have significantly negative 
coefficients. The results are not tabulated for the sake of brevity and are available upon request.  
Second, our focus is to examine whether agency conflicts associated with firm types systematically 
affect the likelihood of replacing poorly-performing CEOs. However, it is possible that family CEOs may 
leave the CEO post voluntarily but remain as or become the chairman of the board to maintain control. If 
so, CEO turnovers in family CEO firms are not necessarily related to performance. To address this concern, 
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we remove those turnovers when the outgoing CEOs remain as or become chairman of the board. In our 
sample, there are 180 such cases. The proportion of departing CEOs serving as the chairman is 
disproportionally higher for family CEO firms: 48.9 percent of such cases occur in family CEO firms. The 
analysis (untabulated) indicates that all our previous results hold.  
Third, related to the last point, some CEO turnovers might result from CEO voluntarily leaving after 
good performance for better opportunities (e.g., to work for a larger company or for higher compensation). 
We replicate the main analyses after excluding turnovers for the top performers (top 10 percent or top 25 
percent based on market adjusted stock returns). The results are quantitatively similar to those reported in 
Table 2.  
 
Results using matched sample 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggests that family CEO firms tend to perform better than 
professional CEO family firms and non-family firms. This can lead to higher CEO turnover frequency in 
professional CEO family firms and non-family firms than in family CEO firms. We control for this effect 
by including indicator variables for family CEO firms and non-family firms. However, it is unclear whether 
performance variation leads to different CEO turnover-performance sensitivity across the three types of 
firms. Nonetheless, in this section, we conduct two additional analyses to ensure that our results are not 
affected by performance differences across firms.  
First, we use a matching research design.  To obtain the matched sample, for each professional CEO 
family firm in a year, we find a family CEO firm in the same industry and with the closest performance, 
and a non-family firm in the same industry and with the closest performance. We measure performance 
using annual market-adjusted stock returns and require that the performance difference falls within the 
range [-0.02, 0.02]. Note that the results are similar if we use a different range or do not use a range. We 
only keep those professional CEO family firms with both matching family CEO firms and matching non-
family firms. That is, if a professional CEO family firm does not have a matching family CEO firm or a 
matching non-family firm, it will be excluded. Using the above procedures, we are able to find matching 
firms for 1,313 professional CEO family firm-years and thus obtain a matched sample of 3,939 firm-years.  
We compare firm performance (market-adjusted stock returns) across the three groups of firms. We 
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find that, for the matched sample, there is no significant difference in firm performance among the three 
groups of firms. (The p-values for the differences in means and medians range from 0.987 to 0.997.) We 
then replicate the main analyses using the matched sample. The results are quantitatively similar to those 
for the full sample as reported in Table 2 and are not tabulated for brevity. Professional CEO family firms 
have significantly higher turnover-performance sensitivity than both family CEO firms and non-family 
firms. The results suggest that our inferences are not driven by performance differences across firms.  
We also conduct another analysis to further ensure that our results are not driven by performance 
differences across firms. We exclude firm-years with performance in the top 50 percent of the sample 
distribution. We find that once those firm-years are excluded, there are no longer significant differences in 
performance across the three groups of firms, suggesting that the difference in performance is driven by the 
better performers. More importantly, we find that our results on turnover-performance sensitivity continue 
to hold and are largely driven by the firm-years with poorer performance, those with lower than average 
performance.  
 
Alternative performance measures 
Since the key measure in this paper is turnover-performance sensitivity, we investigate whether the 
results are robust to alternative performance measures. We replicate the main analyses using the following 
three performance measures: average market-adjusted stock returns in the last three years, industry-adjusted 
stock returns, and volatility-adjusted stock returns. The first measure captures the persistence of poor 
performance; the second controls for industry performance; and the third controls for stock return 
volatility.16  If a CEO happens to perform poorly in a year due to bad luck or perform similarly to other 
firms in the industry, the board might not replace the CEO. However, persistent poor performance or worse 
performance than peers is more likely to prompt the board to take action. The results based on the 
alternative performance measures (untabulated) are similar to our main results in Table 2.  
 
                                                 
16 To the extent that noise in stock returns increases with return volatility, this also addresses the concern 
that our results are affected by noise in performance measures, although there is no strong reason to believe 
that the noise in performance measures varies systematically across the three types of firms. 
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Market reaction to CEO turnover announcements 
In this section, we present tests of the market reaction to CEO turnover announcements. If investors 
initially expect a firm to have difficulty replacing the poorly performing CEO, they will react more 
positively to the announcement of the CEO’s departure when it indeed occurs. We show above that it is 
more difficult to replace poorly performing CEOs in non-family firms and family CEO firms than in 
professional CEO family firms. It thus follows that investors will be more positively surprised if the 
turnover after poor performance indeed occurs in a family CEO firm or a non-family firm. Therefore, we 
predict that the market reaction to CEO turnover announcements is more positive for family CEO firms and 
non-family firms than for professional CEO family firms. Thus, the market reaction test can provide 
corroborative evidence to the turnover tests. In addition, the market reaction test can help us further address 
the concern that performance differences across firms may influence the turnover results, as discussed 
earlier. For instance, if the low CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in family CEO firms captures such 
firms’ better performance, then we will not find that the market reacts more positively to the turnover 
announcement in family CEO firms compared to professional CEO family firms. 
We identify turnover announcement dates and calculate three-day size-adjusted stock returns for 541 
forced turnovers with available data in our sample.17 We then compare the differences in both mean and 
median announcement returns across firm types. The mean market reactions are -2.2 percent, 1.0 percent, 
and -0.2 percent for professional CEO family firms, family CEO firms, and non-family firms, respectively.   
The median market reactions are -1.1 percent, 1.1 percent, and 0.3 percent. Consistent with our conjecture, 
the market reaction is significantly higher for non-family firms and family CEO firms than for professional 
CEO family firms. The magnitude of the difference in means and medians ranges from 1.4 to 3.2 percent 
(the two-sided p-value ranges from 0.001 to 0.036). These results indicate that the ex-ante probability of 
replacing poorly performing CEOs varies across firm types and that market participants factor this into 
their valuation of the firms and react accordingly to the ex post occurrence of CEO turnovers.  
Interestingly, the average market reaction to forced CEO turnover announcements in professional 
CEO family firms is significantly negative (-2.2 percent). This is consistent with the results in other papers 
(e.g., Ertugrul and Krishnan 2011). The negative average return can be consistent with forced CEO 
                                                 
17 Since this is a univariate test that does not control for factors such as CEO age and tenure, we use forced 
turnovers to increase the power of the test; forced turnovers are less likely to be affected by these factors. 
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turnovers conveying adverse information about firm future performance, or with excessive firing in 
professional CEO family firms. If there is indeed excessive firing of CEOs in professional CEO family 
firms, then the lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in family CEO firms does not necessarily 
suggest family entrenchment. We therefore caution readers in interpreting the results.  
 
Alternative explanations for the low CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in family CEO firms 
We argue that the founding families are reluctant to replace poorly-performing family CEOs to 
better protect their private benefits, resulting in lower turnover-performance sensitivity in family CEO 
firms compared to professional CEO family firms. However, there are other possible reasons for this result. 
In this subsection, we summarize these possible explanations and evaluate whether it is likely that they 
drive our results.  
First, it is possible that the nature of CEO turnover is different in family CEO firms. Family CEOs 
might voluntarily leave the CEO post regardless of past performance, but they become or remain as the 
chairman of the board to maintain control. However, as discussed in Section 5, our results continue to hold 
after excluding the cases when the departing CEO becomes or continues to serve as the chairman of the 
board.  
Second, since family owners have longer investment horizon, family CEOs might be less concerned 
with short-term performance and are therefore given extra time to prove themselves, leading to lower 
turnover-performance sensitivity. However, this argument should apply to professional CEO family firms 
as well since family owners in these firms are also long-term oriented. If family CEOs are only given extra 
time because they are members of the founding family, then this scenario itself is an indication of family 
entrenchment. Moreover, as discussed above, the results are similar when we use the average performance 
in the last three years. 
Another alternative explanation for the lower turnover-performance sensitivity in family CEO firms 
is that it is more difficult for them to find suitable replacements than for other firms. On one hand, if family 
CEO firms do not limit themselves to CEO candidates from within the family, they can choose a CEO from 
a large pool of candidates. It can be argued that potential candidates are not willing to join the family firm 
when the founding family has significant influence. But this argument applies to professional CEO family 
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firms as well, although admittedly it might be more difficult to find an outsider to succeed a family CEO 
than to succeed a professional CEO.18 On the other hand, if family CEO firms limit themselves to CEO 
candidates from within the family and are reluctant to replace poorly performing family CEOs in order to 
maintain family control, the argument itself is consistent with family entrenchment. Along this line, if the 
founding family has other suitable candidates in the family for the CEO position, family CEO firms might 
be more likely to replace poorly performing family CEOs. To explore this possibility, we use the number of 
family members sitting on the board as a proxy for the number of potential CEO candidates in the founding 
family and examine how this variable affects the turnover-performance sensitivity. The untabulated 
analyses indicate that having more family members sitting on the board does increase the turnover-
performance sensitivity in family CEO firms. The evidence is thus consistent with founding families trying 
to maintain family management and control.  
Despite the above discussions, it is possible that other unique features of family CEO firms lead to 
lower turnover-performance sensitivity in such firms. Readers should keep this caveat in mind when 
interpreting the results.  
 
Additional analyses: Mergers and acquisitions 
In this subsection, we explore another setting to investigate how family ownership and control affect 
corporate decision: mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Prior research indicates that M&As on average 
reduce firm value and the announcement return is on average negative due to managers’ empire building 
and/or the free cash flow problem (Jensen 1986; Lang et al. 1991). Firms subject to less agency conflicts 
are more likely to make better M&A decisions. If professional CEO family firms are better monitored than 
non-family firms and are less likely to be subject to family entrenchment than family CEO firms, we would 
expect that the M&A announcement return is less negative for professional CEO family firms than for 
family CEO firms and non-family firms. Our research design follows the M&A literature. In an untabulated 
analysis, we find that after controlling for other determinants of M&A announcement return, professional 
CEO family firms have significantly higher M&A market reaction than family CEO firms and non-family 
                                                 
18 When we separate firms with higher family ownership in Panel B of Table 3, we find that professional 
CEO family firms with higher family ownership have even higher turnover-performance sensitivity than 
professional CEO family firms with lower family ownership. This casts doubt on the argument that family 
presence limits the supply of CEOs.  
 25
firms.  
Despite that we find similar results in the M&A setting, we would like to emphasize that one should 
carefully articulate the impact of family ownership and control on the agency conflicts and how such 
agency conflicts are manifested in specific settings. The argument and results in one setting do not 
necessarily generalize to another setting. For example, although the founding family likely protects the 
poorly performing family CEOs in order to better maintain the family’s private benefits, leading to an 
entrenchment problem related to CEO turnover in family CEO firms, family CEO firms might not be 
subject to entrenchment in debt financing setting where the founding family’s interest is aligned with other 
shareholders (Anderson et al. 2003). 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine how CEO turnover-performance sensitivity varies across three types of 
firms–family CEO firms, professional CEO family firms, and non-family firms–in order to shed light on 
the effect of the founding family’s presence on CEO turnover, a key corporate decision.  
In professional CEO family firms, the effective monitoring of CEOs by the founding family leads to 
higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, compared to non-family firms. However, in family CEO 
firms, the founding family may protect the family CEO from being fired after poor performance, leading to 
lower turnover-performance sensitivity than in professional CEO family firms. The empirical results are 
consistent with both predictions. We also find that the market reaction to CEO turnover announcements is 
higher for family CEO and non-family firms than for professional CEO family firms, consistent with 
investors anticipating the difficulty of removing poorly performing CEOs in the former two types of firms 
and hence being more positively surprised by the actual CEO turnover announcements.   
Overall, our analyses indicate that the presence of the founding family has a significant impact on 
CEO turnover decisions. While it aligns the interest of shareholders and managers when a family member 
does not serve as the CEO, it strengthens family power and aggravates agency conflicts between small and 
large shareholders when a family member serves as the CEO. Such impact is systematically reflected in 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity as well as in CEO turnover announcement returns. Our results have 
important implications for future research. We show that family ownership and control have significant 
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impact on CEO turnovers and how and whether family firms are affected by agency conflicts depends on 
who runs the firm.  
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TABLE 1  
Sample composition and descriptive statistics  
This table reports the composition and descriptive characteristics of the sample, which consists of 10,928 
firm-years from 1,865 firms in the S&P 1500 Index (S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P Small-Cap 600 
indexes) covering the period 1996−2005. 
 
Panel A: Sample composition by S&P Index or firm type 
 
 Number of firm-years  Number of unique firms 
 N %  N % 
Total 10,928 100%  1,865 100% 
 
Composition by S&P Index a      
S&P LargeCap 500  3,753 35%  567 33% 
S&P MidCap 400 2,926 27%  464 27% 
S&P SmallCap 600 4,088 38%  674 40% 
      
Composition by firm type      
Family firms  4,804 44%  874 47% 
Family CEO 2,879 26%  560 30% 
Professional CEO 1,925 18%  314 17% 
Non-family firms 6,124 56%  991 53% 
 
a 161 firm-years of 160 firms have missing index classifications in Compustat. 
 
Panel B: Sample composition by both S&P Index and firm type (for firm-years) 
 
 S&P 500  S&P 400  S&P 600 
 N %  N %  N % 
Family CEO firms 571 15%  830 28%  1,417 35% 
Professional CEO family firms 653 18%  437 15%  803 20% 
Non-family firms 2,529 67%  1,659 57%  1,868 45% 
 
Total 3,753 100%  2,926 100%  4,088 100% 
 
 31
TABLE 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics b 
This panel reports the descriptive statistics of CEO and firm characteristics for the full sample and for each type of firms. 
 
  
Full sample  
(N=10,928)  
Family CEO firms 
(N=2,879)  
Professional CEO family 
firms  (N=1,925)  
Non-family firms  
(N=6,124) 
  Mean Std. Median  Mean Std. Median  Mean Std. Median  Mean Std. Median 
Family ownership (%) 6.938 14.160 0.000  18.087 18.872 11.670  12.335 15.416 6.360  0 0 0 
CEO information                
CEO_turnover 0.110 0.313 0.000  0.090 0.286 0.000  0.121 0.326 0.000  0.117 0.321 0.000 
CEO_turnover (forced) 0.058 0.235 0.000  0.039 0.194 0.000  0.075 0.264 0.000  0.062 0.242 0.000 
CEO_age 55.132 7.111 55.000  55.882 8.785 56.000  53.859 6.932 54.000  55.180 6.171 55.000 
CEO_tenure 8.022 7.392 6.000  14.513 9.387 13.000  4.632 4.068 3.000  6.036 4.851 5.000 
CEO_ownership (%) 2.305 5.493 0.287  7.357 8.728 3.450  0.497 1.078 0.170  0.498 1.176 0.171 
Firm characteristics                
Stock returns 0.070 0.422 0.008  0.098 0.480 0.018  0.063 0.428 -0.007  0.058 0.389 0.008 
Return on assets 0.017 0.079 0.010  0.019 0.090 0.013  0.020 0.077 0.016  0.016 0.074 0.008 
Size ($ million) 11,352 53,032 1,647  6,292 46,558 921  7,686 54,858 1,347  14,883 55,007 2,423 
Herfindahl_index 0.145 0.130 0.101  0.147 0.125 0.104  0.150 0.132 0.107  0.142 0.132 0.098 
Growth 0.039 0.085 0.000  0.043 0.098 0.000  0.046 0.092 0.000  0.035 0.074 0.000 
Return volatility 0.104 0.055 0.091  0.116 0.058 0.104  0.107 0.056 0.093  0.098 0.053 0.086 
Leverage 0.182 0.153 0.165  0.162 0.163 0.123  0.168 0.147 0.153  0.196 0.149 0.186 
Corporate governance variables 
Blockholder 0.571 0.495 1.000  0.523 0.500 1.000  0.534 0.499 1.000  0.606 0.489 1.000 
E-index 2.504 1.241 3.000  2.144 1.243 2.000  2.429 1.281 3.000  2.697 1.186 3.000 
CEO_Chair duality 0.658 0.474 1.000  0.734 0.442 1.000  0.411 0.492 0.000  0.699 0.459 1.000 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
 
b The variables are measured in the year before CEO turnover is measured and are defined as follows: 
Family ownership = the percentage of shares held by the founding family (%); 
CEO_turnover = 1 for firm-years with CEO turnover in the next year, and 0 otherwise; 
CEO_turnover (forced) = 1 for firm-years with forced CEO turnover in the next year, and 0 
otherwise; 
CEO_age = CEO’s age in years; 
CEO_tenure = the number of years the CEO has been at the current position; 
CEO_ownership = the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO (%); 
Stock returns = annual market-adjusted stock returns; 
Return on assets  = firm return on assets minus value-weighted average industry return on 
assets; 
Size = firm size, measured as total assets (in millions); 
Herfindahl_index  =  the Herfindahl index for the firm’s industry, measured as the sum of the 
squared market share (based on sales) of all firms in the industry (defined 
based on 3-digit SIC codes); 
Growth = R&D/total assets; 
Return volatility = the standard deviation of monthly market-adjusted stock returns; 
Leverage = long-term debt/total assets; 
Blockholder  = 1 if the outside blockholder ownership (other than the founding family) is 
higher than the sample median; 
E-index = the entrenchment index based on the count of anti-takeover provisions 
developed in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009);  
CEO_Chair duality = 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 2  
CEO turnover–performance sensitivity: The main analysis 
 
This table reports results from the following regression: 
 
         
εVariablesControlβNonFamilyDαFamilyCEODα
NonFamilyDePerformancα
FamilyCEODePerformancα
ePerformancαα)turnover(CEO
b
a

u
u
  




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The sample includes 10,928 firm-years in the period 1996−2005. CEO_turnover is defined as one for firm-
years with CEO turnover in the next year and 0 otherwise; Performance is annual market-adjusted stock 
returns for the left side and industry adjusted return on assets for the right side; D_FamilyCEO is one for 
family firms with a family CEO and 0 otherwise; D_NonFamily is one for non-family firms and 0 
otherwise. Control variables include the following: CEO_ownership is the percentage of outstanding shares 
owned by the CEO (%); CEO_age is CEO’s age in years; CEO_tenure is  the number of years the CEO has 
been at the current position; Size is the log transformation of total assets (in millions); Herfindahl index  is 
the sum of the squared market share (based on sales) of all firms in the industry (defined based on 3-digit 
SIC codes); Blockholder is an indicator for outside blockholder ownership being higher than the sample 
median; E-index is the entrenchment index based on the count of anti-takeover provisions as developed in 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009); and CEO_Chair duality is the indicator for cases where the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board of directors. All the explanatory variables are measured in the year before 
CEO turnover is measured. The p-values, based on standard errors adjusted for firm and year clustering, are 
one-sided for variables with directional predictions and two-sided otherwise.  
 
The marginal effect is the implied change in the CEO turnover probability calculated as follows. For 
Performance, it is calculated as the change in the CEO turnover probability for professional CEO family 
firms, due to a change in performance from its 25th to its 75th percentile value, with the control variables 
taking their respective means. For Performance u D_FamilyCEO (Performance u D_NonFamily), it is 
calculated as the difference in the implied change in the CEO turnover probability due to a change in 
performance (as described above) between family CEO firms (non-family firms) and professional CEO 
family firms. For D_FamilyCEO (D_NonFamily), it is calculated as the difference in the CEO turnover 
probability between family CEO firms (non-family firms) and professional CEO family firms, with 
Performance and control variables taking their respective means. For control variables, it is calculated as 
the change in the CEO turnover probability when the variable of interest changes from its 25th to its 75th 
percentile value, or from 0 to 1 if the variable is a dummy variable, with all other independent variables 
taking their respective means.  
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
 
  
Performance = 
stock return 
 Performance = 
ROA 
 
Predicted 
signs 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Marginal     
effect (%) 
 Estimate 
(p-value) 
Marginal 
effect (%) 
       
Intercept ? -18.177   -18.081  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Performance − -3.790 -6.721  -8.395 -2.610 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Performance uD_FamilyCEO + 3.565 6.603  6.587 2.454 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Performance uD_NonFamily + 1.832 3.978  1.564 1.237 
  (0.001)   (0.024)  
D_FamilyCEO − -1.290 -2.014  -1.580 -3.314 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
D_NonFamily − -0.240 -0.293  -0.261 -0.881 
  (0.020)   (0.011)  
CEO_ownership − -0.132 -0.462  -0.145 -0.570 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
CEO_age + 0.281 8.595  0.288 9.546 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
CEO_tenure − 0.014 0.811  0.026 0.537 
  (0.981)   (0.999)  
Size − -0.114 -0.609  -0.148 -0.927 
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Herfindahl_index − 0.061 0.018  0.398 0.133 
  (0.583)   (0.910)  
Blockholder + 0.120 0.259  0.022 0.059 
  (0.080)   (0.403)  
E-index − 0.020 0.046  0.005 0.014 
  (0.721)   (0.560)  
CEO_Chair duality − 0.194 0.434  0.082 0.212 
  (0.972)   (0.780)  
 
Number of observations 
 
10,928  
 
10,928  
Likelihood ratio  1,692   1,487  
(p-value)  (0.001)   (0.001)  
     
Additional tests:        
Turnover sensitivity for family CEO firms 
(D1+D1a) 
-0.225 -0.118  -1.808 -0.156 
(0.296)   (0.162)  
Turnover sensitivity for non-family firms 
(D1+D1b) 
-1.957 -2.743  -6.830 -1.373 
(0.001)   (0.001)  
Difference in turnover sensitivity between family 
CEO and non-family firms (D1a−D1b) 
1.733   5.023  
(0.001)   (0.001)  
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TABLE 3  
CEO turnover–performance sensitivity: Within family firm variation  
 
This table reports results from variations of the following regression when we further partition family firms 
(with details explained in each panel):  
 
         
εVariablesControlβNonFamilyDαFamilyCEODα
NonFamilyDePerformancα
FamilyCEODePerformancα
ePerformancαα)turnover(CEO
b
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The sample includes 10,928 firm-years in the period 1996−2005. CEO_turnover is defined as one for firm-
years with CEO turnover in the next year and 0 otherwise; Performance is annual market-adjusted stock 
returns; D_FamilyCEO is one for family firms with a family CEO and 0 otherwise; D_NonFamily is one 
for non-family firms and 0 otherwise. Control variables include the following: CEO_ownership is the 
percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO (%); CEO_age is CEO’s age in years; CEO_tenure is  
the number of years the CEO has been at the current position; Size is the log transformation of total assets 
(in millions); Herfindahl index is the sum of the squared market share (based on sales) of all firms in the 
industry (defined based on 3-digit SIC codes); Blockholder is an indicator for outside blockholder 
ownership being higher than the sample median; E-index is the entrenchment index based on the count of 
anti-takeover provisions as developed in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009); and CEO_Chair duality is 
the indicator for cases where the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors. All the explanatory 
variables are measured in the year before CEO turnover is measured. The p-values, based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm and year clustering, are one-sided for variables with directional predictions and 
two-sided otherwise.  
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel A: Partition of family CEO firms into founder CEO firms and descendent CEO firms  
 
In this panel, we partition family CEO firms into founder CEO firms and descendant CEO firms and 
replace D_FamilyCEO in regression (1) with two indicator variables: D_FounderCEO and 
D_DescendantCEO. D_FounderCEO (D_DescendantCEO) is one for family firms with a founder 
(descendant) CEO and 0 otherwise. 
The marginal effect is the implied change in the CEO turnover probability calculated as follows. For 
Performance, it is calculated as the change in the CEO turnover probability for professional CEO family 
firms, due to a change in performance from its 25th to its 75th percentile value, with the control variables 
taking their respective means. For Performance u D_FounderCEO (Performance u D_DescendantCEO, 
Performance u D_NonFamily), it is calculated as the difference in the implied change in the CEO turnover 
probability due to a change in performance (as described above) between founder CEO firms (descendant 
CEO firms, non-family firms) and professional CEO family firms. For D_FounderCEO 
(D_DescendantCEO, D_NonFamily), it is calculated as the difference in the CEO turnover probability 
between founder CEO firms (descendant CEO firms, non-family firms) and professional CEO family firms, 
with Performance and control variables taking their respective means. For control variables, it is calculated 
as the change in the CEO turnover probability when the variable of interest changes from its 25th to its 75th 
percentile value, or from 0 to 1 if the variable is a dummy variable, with all other independent variables 
taking their respective means.  
 
 
Predicted 
signs Estimate P-value 
Marginal 
effect (%) 
Intercept ? -18.227 0.001  
Performance − -3.784 0.001 -6.578 
Performance u D_FounderCEO + 3.197 0.001 6.208 
Performance u D_DescendantCEO + 4.681 0.001 6.855 
Performance u D_NonFamily + 1.841 0.001 3.872 
D_FounderCEO − -1.069 0.001 -1.727 
D_DescendantCEO − -1.845 0.001 -2.399 
D_NonFamily − -0.224 0.028 -0.242 
CEO_ownership − -0.136 0.001 -0.472 
CEO_age + 0.280 0.001 8.424 
CEO_tenure − 0.016 0.990 0.286 
Size − -0.106 0.001 -0.556 
Herfindahl_index − 0.135 0.679 0.039 
Blockholder + 0.124 0.075 0.278 
E-index − 0.025 0.764 0.056 
CEO_Chair duality − 0.134 0.909 0.299 
 
Number of observations  10,928   
Likelihood ratio  1,696   
(p-value)  (0.001)   
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: The incremental impact of high family ownership 
 
In this panel, we partition family CEO firms and professional CEO family firms into those with low and high family 
ownership. We add to regression (1) two indicator variables, D_ProfessionalCEO_High and D_FamilyCEO_High, 
and their interactions with the performance measure. D_ProfessionalCEO_High (D_FamilyCEO_High) is 1 for 
professional CEO family firms (family CEO firms) with 25 percent or higher family ownership and 0 otherwise. 
The marginal effect is the implied change in the CEO turnover probability calculated as follows. For Performance, it 
is calculated as the change in the CEO turnover probability for professional CEO family firms with low family 
ownership, due to a change in performance from its 25th to its 75th percentile value, with the control variables taking 
their respective means. For Performance u D_ProfessionalCEO_High (Performance u D_FamilyCEO, Performance 
u D_NonFamily), it is calculated as the difference in the implied change in the CEO turnover probability due to a 
change in performance (as described above) between professional CEO family firms with high family ownership 
(family CEO firms with low family ownership, non-family firms) and professional CEO family firms with low 
family ownership. For Performance u D_FamilyCEO_High, it is calculated as the difference in the implied change 
in the CEO turnover probability due to a change in performance (as described above) between family CEO firms 
with high family ownership and family CEO firms with low family ownership. For D_ProfessionalCEO_High 
(D_FamilyCEO, D_NonFamily), it is calculated as the difference in the CEO turnover probability between 
professional CEO family firms with high family ownership (family CEO firms with low family ownership, non-
family firms) and professional CEO family firms with low family ownership, with Performance and control 
variables taking their respective means. For D_FamilyCEO_High, it is calculated as the difference in the change in 
the CEO turnover probability between family CEO firms with high family ownership and family CEO firms with 
low family ownership, with Performance and control variables taking their respective means. For control variables, 
it is calculated as the change in the CEO turnover probability when the variable of interest changes from its 25th to 
its 75th percentile value, or from 0 to 1 if the variable is a dummy variable, with all other independent variables 
taking their respective means.  
 
Predicted 
signs Estimate P-value 
Marginal 
 effect (%) 
Intercept ? -18.273 0.001  
Performance − -3.325 0.001 -6.049 
Performance u D_ProfessionalCEO_High  − -3.432 0.001 -7.618 
Performance u D_FamilyCEO + 3.087 0.001 5.907 
Performance u D_FamilyCEO_High  + 0.763 0.014 1.094 
Performance u D_NonFamily + 1.345 0.001 3.104 
D_ProfessionalCEO_High + 0.007 0.491 0.754 
D_FamilyCEO − -1.191 0.001 -2.072 
D_FamilyCEO_High − -1.295 0.001 -0.440 
D_NonFamily − -0.211 0.043 -0.337 
CEO_ownership − -0.096 0.001 -0.312 
CEO_age + 0.282 0.001 8.496 
CEO_tenure − 0.016 0.991 -0.290 
Size − -0.109 0.001 -0.574 
Herfindahl_index − 0.114 0.652 -0.033 
Blockholder + 0.095 0.139 0.213 
E-index − 0.014 0.654 -0.031 
CEO_Chair duality − 0.131 0.902 -0.291 
Number of observations  10,928   
Likelihood ratio  1,670   
(p-value)  (0.001)   
  
 
